Various models have been used to explain differences in non-human wealth holdings in a capitalist society. Some refer to the importance of inter-generational transfers such as bequests of assets while others emphasize the role of inter-vivos transfers such as knowledge and information, in addition to those intended to facilitate capital accumulation (e.g., assistance with down payment for home purchases). In this study, I follow a different approach and focus on the links between private wealth and public policy. First, it will be shown that private sector wealth corresponds to the accumulated public debt and that public budget deficits are a source of wealth for the private sector. The second part of the argument demonstrates that particular economic policies have different effects on the wealth holdings of different groups of society. For instance, a low interest-rate policy will clearly benefit those who must borrow money (viz. businesses and potential buyers of homes and other assets) but at the expense of the rentiers and vice-versa. Similarly, other policies (e.g., spending on public infrastructure) will have disproportionate effects on individuals depending on their location, social status, and other characteristics that increase or lower their opportunities to take advantage of the derived benefits from such spending.
Introduction
Even though economic theory recognizes health, knowledge, and education as important elements of human wealth, in popular debates on wealth, the general focus is still on the acquisition of physical and financial assets. For instance, the Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines wealth as "the stock of useful goods having economic value in existence at any one time". This definition reflects the widespread importance of material wealth in the lives of individuals in contemporary (capitalist) societies. Aside from some perverse needs that may be qualified as sheer greed, it is clear that the purpose of seeking to accumulate such wealth is justified by the desire to ensure our well-being throughout our lifetime, as well as that of our offsprings.
The question of why some people are stupendously rich while others are extremely poor has always been at the centre of the debate on social issues. At the heart of the debate is the issue of equal opportunities to acquire wealth. While in aristocracies wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few and passed on to their descendants and heirs, in democratic societies we expect everyone to enjoy the comforts of good life that wealth provides. In reviewing Tocqueville's work (1835), Robert Goodin (2001) summarized what he considers as Tocqueville's major distinctions between "democratic wealth" and "aristocratic wealth": a) whereas aristocratic wealth is inherited, democratic wealth is earned. Democracies offer 'equal opportunities' in ways that aristocracies do not, when it comes to acquiring wealth. b) whereas aristocratic wealth is stable, democratic wealth circulates. Democracies offer opportunities for people to 'take it in turn' to be wealthy, in ways that aristocracies do not. c) whereas aristocratic wealth gives its holders permanent power in the community, democratic wealth is only a temporary power source. Democracies offer opportunities for people to 'take it in turn' being powerful, depending on their fleeting fortunes, in contrast to aristocracies which vest permanent wealth and hence permanent power in an entrenched elite.
It must be clear from the above distinctions that "democratic wealth" can not be equated with social justice since it accepts the fact that there will always be some who are rich and others who are poor, with the increased probability that some of the poor may one day become rich and viceversa, thus reflecting Tocqueville's (1835: 611) observation that "the rich daily rise out of the crowd and constantly return thither". Although the economic situation of some people does improve over time (after graduation, retraining, experience, etc.) , this can not be considered as social mobility. Tocqueville's claim is certainly exaggerated because as noted by Galbraith (2000) "single moms don't move from welfare to Forbes 400". Furthermore, it must also be noted that the mobility that transpires from the notion of "democratic wealth" is not a result of society's deliberate implementation of the democratic ideals but rather a consequence of the increased volatility and instability of market economies. However, recent trends and the current state of income and wealth distribution worldwide (Galbraith, 1998; Levy Institute, 1999) indicate that an equitable distribution of wealth can not be achieved through market forces, regardless of the degree of volatility and fluctuations. As Goodin (2001: 75) put it "no realistic amount of randomisation is ever likely to come remotely close to eradicating life-long inequalities owing to people's initial circumstances". Therefore, "If we want democratic equality across the whole income distribution, . . ., random walk is not enough and redistribution through deliberate public interventions is required" Goodin (2001: 70) .
The purpose of the present study is to show that, contrary to common belief, prosperity and "democratic wealth" in a capitalist economy depend in a crucial way on a greater government intervention. A corollary of this statement is that it is in the private sector's interest (and that of society as a whole) to develop a strong public sector, capable of providing not only law and order but also, and more importantly, social services and public goods that are essential to growth, prosperity, and equality. In the next section, I argue that unfettered inheritance is an impediment to democratization of wealth. In section 3, I show that public sector activity helps the private sector to generate profits and, therefore, to create and accumulate wealth. Section 4 deals with the wealth effects of particular public policies. Some concluding remarks are given in the last section.
Gifts That Really Count
The distribution of wealth is widely accepted as a good measure of social justice. For this reason, the impact of inter-generational transfers of wealth on its distribution is one of the important issues in the debate about social polarization and wealth inequality in most democratic societies. Although the famous saying according to which, in modern societies, "wealth never survives three generations" suggests that inheritance is no longer a major source of wealth and social power, there is strong evidence that indicates otherwise. Wealth, in these societies, is not only earned, it is also inherited. In the USA, bequests of assets have been estimated to account for up to 46 per cent of households' wealth (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981; Kopczuk and Lupton, 2000) . Some studies have found links between inter-generational transfers and the continued racial inequality in the distribution of aggregate wealth (Blau and Graham, 1991; Menchik and Jianakoplos, 1997; Hurst, Luoh and Stafford, 1998; Wolff, 1998) . For instance, Darity and Meyers (1998) show that "simultaneous with the rise in general inequality has been a worsening of the relative income position of black families in America" and that there has been a "widening of the gap between whites and blacks." Using historical data, Billings and Blee (2000) have shown that today's poverty in the Appalachia region is the result of long-standing social and economic patterns of inequality that favoured the elite families engaged in the timber, mining, oil and gas extraction industries. In a study of wealth distribution in Australia, Badcock (1994: 626) concluded that "the concentration of wealth within the housing market, together with the pattern of housing inheritance, is undoubtedly helping to create a more unequal society." Casual observation as well as empirical research indicate that children's educational attainment and their earning capacity are greatly influenced by their parents' wealth and social status. Some studies (see among others, Solon, 1992; Lam, 1999) have shown that there are inter-generational correlations in educational levels and in occupational earnings. Chiteji and Stafford (2000) find that the differences in asset ownership between African-Americans and other families are explained by differences in ownership patterns, values, and knowledge held by the parents and the families. It is also important to note that the size and amount of gifts and inter-generational transfers matter a great deal for the recipient generation since some bequests are insignificant while others allow the beneficiaries to immediately acquire a home or start a business (Loury, 1981; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995) . The general conclusion is that inheritance of wealth perpetuates inequality and further polarizes society (Galbraith, 2000; Nissan, 2001) . To counteract these negative effects and alleviate poverty, several alternatives have been proposed. They range from inheritance tax to capital grants to young people or a guaranteed basic income for all citizens.
The advantages and disadvantages of an inheritance tax have been widely discussed in the literature (Shoup, 1966; Feldstein, 2000; Soros, 2000; Gale and Perozek, 2000) . To emphasize its supposedly negative effects, opponents of the inheritance tax call it "death tax" and "double tax". They argue that it discourages savings, work, investment, and accumulation, all of which is bad for growth and society. Consequently, as Kindleberger (2001: 15) observed, "many want it abolished, though it is paid by only a small percentage of the population." The main argument for the inheritance tax is that it contributes to creating a meritocratic society in which success depends on talents and qualifications, and not on social status and unearned inheritance. Galbraith (2000: 74) , for instance, writes "...our children should inherit not a personal fortune but a society in which the reasonable chance to do well in life, to rise and prosper according to merit, is not foreclosed. The estate tax is merely one small, but useful, instrument to that effect." Some writers have shown that the inheritance tax alters the gift-giving behaviour to heirs and increases the probability and amount of inter-vivos transfers and spending, arguing that its elimination would reduce the yearly amount of such transfers by nearly 30 percent (in the USA). For instance, McGarry (2000: 93) maintains that: "[Estate and gift] taxes increase the cost of transferring wealth to heirs and may therefore make consumption and charitable giving more appealing options for the potential donor. Details of the estate-and gift-tax code [in the USA] also provide strong incentives for gifts to be made at certain times in the donor's life, and to be made to particular recipients. These incentives likely affect the well-being of both donors and recipients and may alter the total amount given over a lifetime." (McGarry, 2000: 93) Others argue that the estate tax has redistributive effects in the sense that it encourages charitable donations (Soros, 2000) or that it constitutes a source of government revenue, which can be used to help the poor (Wolff, 1995; Galbraith, 2000) . While we agree that the inheritance tax may encourage social and economic mobility and that it can be used to redistribute wealth, my analysis of the redistributive effects of taxation is fundamentally different from this widely held view. In my opinion, unless the inheritance tax involves dividing physical assets and giving parts thereof to the poor (such as in the case of an agrarian reform, estate and housing, etc.), it cannot have the 'Robin Hood' type of redistributive effects emphasized by the orthodox theory.
Referring to the role of taxes in this case, i.e., of a pure economy where no money exists, Parguez (2000: 8) wrote: "In such an economy, the Robin Hood paradox is true. The State is redistributing the real income it has previously levied by use of sheer force on private agents. The State is behaving like the feudal lords who forced the bondsmen to deliver them a share of their preexisting crops." (Parguez, 2000: 8) .
However, as shown in Bougrine and Seccareccia (2001) , when we are dealing with a monetary economy, which is the case of all modern societies, taxes on monetary and financial transactions do not generate any income for the government since they are part of a reflux process by which money is being destroyed rather than created. Therefore, taxes cannot possibly be used to fund social programs or other projects. For this reason, taxes in general, and the inheritance tax in particular, can only redistribute wealth in the sense that a progressive taxation system would prevent the rich from accumulating so much wealth while allowing the less wealthy or the poor to accumulate more, so that over time we may achieve a more equal distribution of wealth in society.
If it is generally accepted that societies should seek a democratic governance, not everyone agrees that 'equal opportunities' in the economic realm is a good thing. Some argue that inequality is good for growth and progress. For instance, Bartlett (2000: 56) writes: "the rich perform a public service when they engage in what Thorstein Veblen called "conspicuous consumption." They are, in effect, underwriting the cost of bringing new products to market that ultimately become ubiquitous and available to everyone. Since it's not much fun to be rich if everyone can enjoy the same products, the rich aid innovation by pushing the limit of what is possible, encouraging producers to meet their demand in return for large profits. But if the rich perform a valuable social function, must we conclude that they be allowed to pass on their wealth to their descendants and heirs? Does it necessarily follow that the inheritance and estate tax should be abolished?" Bartlett answers both questions in the affirmative, arguing that the estate tax is an infringement on private property, in addition to the familiar disincentive effects mentioned above. However, as pointed out by Galbraith (2000) , since Bartlett (2000: 58) agrees that "[i]ncome and wealth mobility are unambiguously good because they mitigate inequality" and that "inheritances are insignificant as a source of major wealth in America", his logical conclusion should have been to support the inheritance tax rather than advocate its abolition.
Bartlett's reference to private property rights and his rejection of public redistributive policies are nothing new. Since the rise of modern capitalism and with the publication of Adam Smith's Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations in 1776, the conventional wisdom has been that the best prescription for prosperity is a free-market economy in which the government acts only as a watchdog, essentially providing law and order but playing no substantial role in economic activity. Although this ideal "laissez-faire" type of economy never really existed anywhere 1 , advocates of free markets like to emphasize the idea that capitalism owes much of its success to 'economic freedom' defined as market supremacy. The basic premise behind such affirmation is that markets are always "right" and that they ensure economic efficiency, whereas government decisions are inherently inefficient. Even though there is no clear and unambiguous evidence that supports these statements (see Agell, Lindh, and Ohlsson, 1997) , they are widely used to justify the decisions to curtail public sector activity (less government spending, less taxes, and privatization of public corporations and other services such as education, health and other social programs). As will be shown in the next section, if the short-term effects of such a strategy are damaging to the economy, its long-term effects may threaten the viability of the whole system.
Public Policy and Private Wealth
How does public policy affect private wealth? Public policy is typically defined as government intervention in the form of public spending and taxing of private economic activity. Standard theory maintains that taxation is needed to finance government spending and that public deficits arise when such spending exceeds the "revenues" collected from taxes. It is well known from the literature on public finance that the orthodox theory rejects public deficits (Musgrave, ..) and opposes any policy that seeks to increase government spending beyond the limits set by "tax revenues" (Toye, 2000) . The basic argument in support of this view is that financing of economic activity (private and public) is constrained by the accumulated savings. Consequently, when the government runs a deficit, it must compete with the private sector for the limited available funds, which leads to an increase of interest rates. Higher interest rates lower private investment but attract foreign capital inflows, which lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate. This, in turn, discourages exports and encourages imports, thus causing a trade deficit. Furthermore, it is argued when budget deficits are monetized, the result is higher inflation, which leads to a further increase in (cheaper) imported goods and loss of competitiveness. The conclusion is that budget deficits must be avoided because, in addition to all this, they also lead to a higher debt, which jeopardizes the standards of living of future generations.
Several empirical studies have demonstrated that the above conclusions are misleading. For instance, Seccareccia and Sood (2000) , using data from six major OECD countries, have shown that the fears of inflation from budget deficits are unfounded. Others have found no causal relationship between budget deficits and trade deficits, thus rejecting the so-called "twin deficits" idea (see among others, Blecker, 1992) . However, the most damaging criticism to the conclusions of the orthodox model is the one attacking the central premise according to which investment expenditures require the prior existence of a stock of accumulated savings. In the classical world of Adam Smith and others, societies which value thrift and save more, will grow rapidly because high savings allow more investment projects to be undertaken. In the Keynesian analysis, high saving rates mean that a smaller portion of income is spent on consumption goods. Low sales, in turn, mean that realized profits will be low and that firms will have to lower their production and, in the process, lay off workers. The resulting unemployment and loss of income further reduce consumption and profits and force firms to cut down on their investment plans. The higher the saving rate is, the worse the outcome will be. The 'paradox of thrift' may be so severe that it can raise the prospects of bankruptcy for some firms. Contrary to the classical view, in the Keynesian framework investment opportunities depend on the existence of an effective demand that can sustain firms' current and planned profits. Investment precedes saving since the former generates an income, which determines the levels of consumption and saving. Therefore, we conclude that investment (private and public) cannot be constrained by the availability of savings 2 . The question that needs to be addressed then is the following: How is investment, and production in general, financed?
The short answer is that investment expenditures are financed by money. Without money, production cannot take place. The question then becomes: Where does money come from and how is it created? In modern capitalist economies, money is created ex nihilo via bank credit advances to entrepreneurs who hire labourers in order to produce goods and services for households, as well as capital equipment for inter-firms exchanges. The processes of production and exchange involve transactions that continuously create or destroy money. This process is analysed in detail by the Circuit theory as described in Graziani (1990 Graziani ( , 1997 , Lavoie (1992) , and Parguez and Seccareccia (2000) , among others, and is briefly summarized here. At the beginning of the production cycle, one might assume that entrepreneurs have no accumulated savings and no money, but have ideas and plans. Based on their expectations and assessment of market conditions, they decide to produce a given level of output, which will be sold for a given price. However, in order to implement their production plans, they require short-term loans, and must, therefore, borrow cash advances from banks, which supply credit based on their own assessment of firms' creditworthiness. This type of finance requirement that depends on the costs of production is referred to in the literature as initial finance and is part of the flux phase of the monetary circuit.
In the second phase, firms begin recovering the money initially paid out to households (viz., in the form of wages). This is done through the sale of output that was produced during the first stage. The proceeds, which are used to eventually pay back the debt owed to banks, are known as final finance and are associated with the reflux phase of the monetary circuit. If households' propensity to save is nil, firms need not issue new securities since households will spend their entire wages and salaries in the commodities market, thus ensuring that the monetary circuit is easily closed. However, if households' saving is positive, firms will need to issue new securities in order to capture more of the money paid out during the flux phase. If, in addition, households have a preference for liquidity and choose to hold part of their savings in the form of bank deposits, the closure of the monetary circuit becomes somewhat problematic, as shown in Bougrine and Seccareccia (2001): [...] there is one case in which the closure of the monetary circuit is not possible because of the Keynesian problem of household liquidity preference. In the case where households choose to hold part of their savings in the form of bank deposits, banks would now be forced into a sort of perverse financial "intermediation" role of re-issuing shortterm loans to firms caused by the existence of liquid household deposits withdrawn from the reflux process. Needless to say, this Keynesian problem of insufficient reflux from the private sector to ensure the closure of the monetary circuit would easily disappear if some other sector, particularly the government sector, would incur deficits, by providing the additional liquidity to offset the leakage because of strong household preference for liquidity (Bougrine and Seccareccia, 2001: 5) What this means is that, as long as there is some preference for liquidity, firms will not be able to pay back all their loans since their receipts will be less than their initial disbursements. Consequently, when the new cycle begins, firms will need to borrow new loans and the old ones are simply rolled over (see Lavoie, 1992) . Since liquidity preference is a major characteristic of modern monetary economies, firms, as a sector, are always in deficit because part of their debt will remain unpaid. Moreover, since credit is advanced to firms at the start of each production cycle, thus making the monetary circuit continual, firms will continuously be in debt, especially in a growing economy. This is a normal situation for business enterprises, which allows us to conclude that the accumulated deficits, or debt, do not seem to hinder firms' performance in any way. On the contrary, deficits are necessary because the firms sector is unable to finance its production without credit from the banking sector.
Let us now introduce the government sector and analyse its role in this process. The central thesis of this paper is that public deficits are a source of wealth creation for the private sector. This can be shown in several ways. First, as emphasized in Keynesian analysis, if we divide a closed economy into a private sector and a public sector, we must recognize that a deficit (surplus) in the public sector necessarily corresponds to a surplus (deficit) in the private sector. This can be seen easily by manipulating the national income identity to get:
which, for the open economy, can be written as:
S -I = (G -T) + (X -M)
where S stands for saving, I for investment, G for government spending, T for taxes, X for exports and M for imports. The above equation states that private net saving is equivalent to government deficit plus the balance of payments surplus. It also implies that, for a given position of the balance of payments, any attempt to balance the public budget and/or achieve a surplus will necessarily result in a reduction of the private sector's savings, and hence of its wealth. Moreover, since a public surplus means, by definition, that the government is withdrawing more resources from the private economy than it is injecting in it (G -T < 0), government surpluses necessarily lower aggregate demand, which results in lower sales and profits for private firms.
Using a simple Kaleckian model, Bougrine (2000), Lavoie (2000) and Halevi and Kriesler (2000) have shown that there exists a direct relationship between private firms' profits and public deficits (see also, Parguez, 1985; Lavoie, 1992; Seccareccia and Sharpe, 1993) . According to this approach, total savings of the private sector (S) can be decomposed into households' savings (S h ) and firms' savings or, more precisely, their retained earnings (R), so that in terms of our equation (2) above we have:
which can be rewritten as:
R = (I -S h ) + (G -T) + (X -M)
(3') Equation (3') clearly indicates that firms' profits are positively affected by investment, government spending, and exports. It is also clear that households' savings, taxes, and imports lower business profits. This should not come as a surprise since we have already seen that within the monetary circuit, firms receipts correspond to their actual sales and that they fail to capture a portion of their initial outlays in the case of positive savings and liquidity preference. It is not necessary to emphasize that households' expenditures are out of their disposable income (net of taxes) and that what is not spent on domestic products ( S h and M) necessarily reduces firms revenues and, therefore, their retained earnings (or profits). In other words, long-run firms' profits can be sustained by: a) low or negative households' savings (indebtedness), b) a public budget deficit, and/or c) an improvement in the balance of payments. In this framework, public deficits, (G -T > 0), are clearly a source of profits for firms, whereas balanced budgets and surpluses will, respectively, have no effect or reduce profits. Firms are in business, and stay in business, only if they make profits. Lower profits reduce firms' incentives to expand their productive capacity or consider new investment projects, which eliminates new opportunities for making profits. In such a situation, firms will find it difficult to pay back their loans and may face higher prospects of bankruptcy. In this context, we find it ironic that free market pundits should be advocating a policy based on balanced budgets and/or surpluses.
There is an even more fundamental reason why free market advocates should not be arguing for balanced budgets and public surpluses. As mentioned by Tyson (2001) and Palley (2001) , the issue has to do with the possibility of investing 'excess government savings' (from surpluses) in private assets once the public debt has been paid off. The question was raised by the US Federal reserve chairman, Allan Greenspan, who is concerned about the potential dangers of such a possibility (Greenspan, 2001) . Even though Greenspan attempts to downplay the fears associated with this scenario when he tells the press that 'the problems of paying off the debt are better than any solution he knows', he is seriously concerned when addressing policymakers. For instance, in his testimony before the US Senate, he says "continuing to run surpluses beyond the point at which we reach zero or near-zero federal debt brings to center the critical longer-term fiscal policy issue of whether the federal government should accumulate large quantities of private . . . assets" adding that "This development should factor materially into the policies you [the Senate] and the Administration choose to pursue." (Greenspan, 2001: 61) .
To see the importance of the point raised by Greenspan, let us assume that the budget deficit is financed either by "money creation" or by "borrowing" as argued by the orthodox theory. In this case, we would have:
where i is the rate of interest charged on the debt, D; t is the tax rate, Y is income, and M is the money supply. Equation (4) indicates that the budget is balanced when the left-hand side is equal to zero. Otherwise, if total spending (G + iD) exceeds "tax revenue" t(Y + iD), there is a deficit, which must be financed by issuing bonds that are sold to the private sector, thus increasing the government debt by )D, or to the central bank, which pays for them by "printing" new money )M. Obviously, a budget surplus would mean the opposite: the debt or the stock of money, or both, must be decreasing.
One of the declared objectives of the proponents of 'sound finance' and nearly all present-day governments is to pay off the public debt. The problem raised by Greenspan is what to do with the surplus once the debt has been paid off. In this case, there are only two options: either continue decreasing the stock of money or use "the accumulated surplus" to buy shares and securities in private corporations. Neither option should appeal to free market advocates since the first one will lead to deflation and the second one might progressively lead to nationalization of private enterprise (see Palley, 2001 ), a move that goes against the current trend of globalization, which praises deregulation and privatization of public corporations.
The Wealth Effects of Government Policies
Equation (4) above indicates that government outlays consist of general spending on investment, goods and services (G) as well as interest payments on the debt (iD). It is obvious that the latter share of government spending is an income for the rentiers, who in the end are wealthy households who are holding the public debt either directly or through banks and other financial institutions. An immediate consequence of wiping out the public debt is the elimination of this source of income for public debt holders, thus reducing their opportunities to accumulate and increase wealth. Interest payments to rentiers are a cost to firms and individuals who need to borrow funds to finance their investment projects. With the exception that they increase rentiers' wealth, higher interest rates have negative effects on private wealth for the following reasons: a) they lower the value of assets held by households and firms. b) they increase the costs paid out by firms and consequently lower their profits, which in turn lowers opportunities for expansion and job creation through new investments. c) they discourage households from borrowing f unds to start new businesses and, therefore, limit the opportunities for them to improve their wealth and well being. This leads us to conclude that a government that pursues a high interest-rate policy must be attempting to favour and protect the interests of the rentiers against all other groups of society. The question that arises then is the following: What causes interest rates to rise and how can we control them?
Orthodox theory does not bother going beyond the simple market-forces paradigm and gives the easy answer that interest rates increase automatically when demand for funds exceeds their supply. Some Post-Keynesians argue that interest rates are exogenously determined and their levels are set by the Central Bank, which can easily manipulate them according to the government's objectives and policies (Moore, 1988; Lavoie, 1992; Smithin, 1996) . While this view describes correctly what is common practice in modern economies, there is more to be gained by exploring the mechanisms that actually allow the Central Bank to have such a control over interest rates. Parguez (2000: 15) follows this approach when he argues that interest rates variations are determined by the size of the deficit/surplus of the State.
As mentioned earlier, a public deficit increases the net income received by the private sector (G -T > 0). When private (individual or corporate) citizens deposit their income from the government into their accounts with commercial banks, the balance sheet of the latter is increased by an equal amount on the liabilities side (to the depositors) and the assets side (since commercial banks now hold government money). This means that commercial banks' reserves with the Central Bank will increase. It is well known from the literature on money and banking that such reserves (government money) do not pay interest whereas government bonds do. Since commercial banks are profit-maximisers, they do not wish to hold funds that generate no income. Hence, the demand by commercial banks for government bonds increases. However, if the government, via its Central Bank, decides not to issue any new bonds, the price of the latter would increase and their yield, the interest rate, would fall. The Central Bank can therefore control the interest rate by controlling the issue of bonds, the demand for which can be manipulated by controlling the size of the deficit/surplus. It is clear from the above analysis that budget deficits lead to a fall in interest rates. Since low interest rates have the opposite effects of those listed in the first paragraph of this section, we presume that a democratic society would prefer lower interest rates and, therefore, would prefer to pursue a public policy that is based on budget deficits, not surpluses. Low interest rates allow ordinary citizens to have access to credit and give them the opportunity to borrow in order to purchases homes and acquire other valuable assets. In this manner, low interest rates contribute to spreading wealth to a larger portion of society and, therefore, to creating a "democratic wealth". In Tocqueville's terminology, we might say that a low-interest rate policy is the distinctive characteristic of democracies since it offers the people 'equal opportunities' to have access to wealth. The dominant trend of fiscal orthodoxy, which is based on budget surpluses serves the immediate interests of the rentier class, thus conferring power onto an 'entrenched elite'.
As mentioned above, public surpluses amount to a net withdrawal of funds from the private sector (G -T < 0). In order to compensate for the loss of income previously derived from the government sector and to maintain their spending (consumption) levels, households will be forced to borrow from banks 3 . Equation (3') above states that households' indebtedness is a source of profits for firms. It could therefore help firms to maintain their sales volumes and prevent a recession, at least for some time. However, as emphasized by Godley (2000) , households' negative savings cannot continue indefinitely. A policy of long-term budget surpluses would force households into unsustainable debt because "the decisive constraint on borrowing may come not from the extent to which net worth is being mortgaged, but from the extent to which payments of interest and repayments of principal . . . can be met out of conventional income. It is income rather than net worth that is ultimately the criterion of creditworthiness, since in a crisis it may be impossible for everyone to realize assets simultaneously" [emphasis added] (Godley, 2000: 4) . The constraint will indeed become binding since households' income is continuously being eroded by long-term budget surpluses. Furthermore, once households decide to stop borrowing and start saving (or reducing their negative savings), aggregate demand, and consequently production, must fall, thus leading to a recession unless the government reverses the surplus policy and starts increasing its expenditures.
The view according to which government spending has positive effects on the private sector is nothing new. Other studies before, some of them using standard neoclassical models, have shown that government spending in the form of public infrastructure increases productivity in the private sector. For instance, Aschauer (1991) and Munnell (1990 Munnell ( , 1992 , among others, go as far as to argue that the productivity slowdown that characterized most of the industrialized countries since the 1970s, is largely due to the decline of public investment that followed from the conservative policies of spending cuts in order to eliminate budget deficits. Munnell with the assistance of Cook (1990) argue that unequal distribution of public infrastructure contributes to regional disparities if certain areas are neglected. Bougrine (1995) also argues that a well developed infrastructure attracts more capital investment, which in turn attracts labour and improves employment opportunities. The resulting agglomeration economies have been found to promote higher wages through technical progress, innovation, and productivity increases (Bougrine, 1994) . Contrary to those living in 'neglected areas', workers who live in regions where such agglomeration economies prevail, will undoubtedly benefit from government spending and, therefore, improve their wealth and well being.
Inequality in access to benefits from government spending does not only follow spacial lines. Social status, age, sex, and race are also important characteristics that can cause a bias in allocating government outlays. Studies on gender and racial inequality, for instance, have shown that women and minorities seldom have the same access to government jobs or to benefits from publicly funded services (e.g., higher education, subsidies and capital grants, and so on) (see among others, Peterson, 2001) . Therefore, in order to prevent wealth from becoming concentrated in the hands of a few (either because of their location, gender or race, etc.) and in order to make it truly "democratic" in the sense invoked by Tocqueville (1835) and emphasized by Goodin (2001) , governments must follow a policy based on public deficits and low interest rates while ensuring that their expenditures are spread evenly across the territory under their jurisdiction.
Conclusion
Studies dealing with private wealth and its distribution tend to exaggerate the role of market forces and reject government intervention. The essence of their conclusions is that free, unfettered markets guarantee the best outcome. In this paper, I have argued that the creation of private wealth and its equal distribution in capitalist societies depend in a crucial way on the implementation of a democratic public policy. In particular, it was shown that public deficits are an important source of wealth for the private sector, which also benefits from the positive effects of low interest rates (with the exception of the rentiers) and a more generous public spending on social programs. The advantages of this policy mix is that it allows more people to have access to equal opportunities to acquire wealth and, in this sense, together with a progressive taxation system, contributes to the creation of a "democratic wealth". It was also argued that policies seeking to balance budgets and achieve surpluses have long-term destructive effects on the private sector's wealth and, for this reason, should be rejected by all free-market advocates.
